Imposing Rules by Schauer, Frederick






The literature on rules, like the literature on authority, is a literature of 
the subjects.  Although the practice of rule-based governance requires, at 
the least, both a rule-imposer and a rule-subject, it is the rule-subject 
who attracts the bulk of our attention, or so one would infer from 
looking at the philosophical and jurisprudential literature.  Within this 
literature, the subjects of rules loom large, with the most concentrated 
attention being devoted to exploring the moral, political, and legal 
responsibilities of those whose decisions and actions would be constrained 
by the rules that others impose upon them.1
Yet although the issues surrounding the morality and rationality of 
rule-following are indeed important, the parallel issues of rule-imposition 
are no less so.  When we examine the morality and rationality of rule-
imposition, however, we discover structural differences between the 
standpoint2 of the rule-imposer and that of the rule-subject, differences 
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that make the morality and rationality of rule-imposition considerably 
more divergent from the morality and rationality of rule-following than 
is commonly appreciated.  It is just that divergence—the divergence 
between the perspective of the rule-imposer and the perspective of the 
rule-subject—that I seek to explore here. 
I. 
As I shall emphasize throughout these comments, much of the 
literature on obedience to (or disobedience of) rules3 assumes that the 
subject’s proposed act is either beneficial or, if not positively beneficial, 
then at least harmless, or, if not harmless, then at least harmful only to 
the subject herself.  Perceived from the standpoint of the subject, the 
worst we can imagine of any action is that it is harmful only to the 
subject, and the best we can imagine is that the act is somewhere 
between morally neutral and morally advantageous.  Yet the universe of 
human actions is not exhausted by the categories of beneficial, harmless, 
and harmful only to the actor.  There is still another category, and it is a 
highly significant one, for some actions are harmful to others—murder, 
rape, assault, price fixing, the sale of tainted foods, and the dumping of 
toxic waste, for example—and it is in the realm of such other-regarding 
and harmful acts that questions about the morality and rationality of 
rule-imposition become important. 
With respect to other-regarding and harm-producing actions,4 the 
primary question is the question of intervention.5  If Sid perceives Rick 
about to commit an assault against Barbara, for example, what should 
Sid do?  Putting aside Sid’s concerns for his own safety, a moral and 
rational Sid should intervene if he perceives it right to protect Barbara 
against Rick, but should of course not intervene if he perceives Barbara 
as being in no danger—Rick and Barbara might be play-acting for 
example.  This is obvious, and verges on the tautological, but what is 
important about this scenario is that rules need play no part in Sid’s 
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decision whether to intervene.  Sid should intervene when it is the right 
thing to do, but not when it is the wrong thing to do, and rules do not 
come into the equation.  So if it happens that a rule tells Sid to intervene 
when intervention is the right thing to do, then the rule is superfluous, 
and if a rule tells Sid to intervene when nonintervention is the right thing 
to do, then it is pernicious, and, arguably, ought to be disregarded.6  And 
so too in reverse, with rules that would mandate nonintervention when it 
is not right to intervene being superfluous, and rules that would mandate 
nonintervention when intervention is indicated being perverse.  When 
we are talking about single acts of intervention or nonintervention, 
therefore, rules turn out to be either superfluous or perverse, and it is 
thus difficult to perceive their virtues. 
II. 
Things look dramatically different, however, when we move beyond 
single acts of intervention or nonintervention, for here there is an 
important asymmetry.  Even though a rule will regulate a multiplicity of 
events—that is just what rules do,7 and it is what distinguishes rules (or 
standing orders) from particularized commands—the subject of the rule 
sees only one.  From the perspective of the subject, the generality of a 
rule disappears, and she sees only a particularized conflict between what 
she wishes (rightly, from her perspective) to do (or not to do), and what 
the rule indicates with respect to this particular action.  And from this 
perspective, as Scott Shapiro rightly emphasizes in his remarks here, 
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scenario.  See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, 
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 34–36, 53–59 (2001); Donald H. Regan, Reasons, 
Authority, and the Meaning of “Obey”: Further Thoughts on Raz and Obedience to Law, 
3 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 20 (1990); Donald H. Regan, Authority and 
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assume the absence of authority here because it is the absence of authority from the 
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authority from the authority’s point of view even when there is no case for authority 
from the subject’s point of view, then there is an a fortiori case for authority from the 
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rules once again are either superfluous or perverse.8
From the perspective of the putative intervener with respect to harmful 
action, however, the generality of a rule hardly disappears.  If the 
putative intervener is considering intervening with respect to a single 
action, rules are either superfluous or perverse, but there is no reason to 
believe that intervention, unlike obedience or disobedience, must necessarily 
be particular rather than general, singular rather than multiple.  As a 
potential intervener looks out upon the world, she may well see not only 
one but rather numerous opportunities for intervention.  In theory she 
could intervene one intervention at a time, making the intervention or 
nonintervention decision on a case-by-case or particularistic basis.  But life 
is short, resources are scarce, and time is limited.  From the perspective 
of the intervener the challenge is pressing—so much evil, so little time.  
So the intervener often intervenes wholesale rather than retail, deciding 
to intervene for a class of cases rather than one case at a time.  And of 
course we rarely refer to this as wholesale intervention; we simply call it 
policymaking.  Sometimes we simply call it rulemaking. 
III. 
The question is now transformed.  No longer are we concerned with 
whether a rational rule-subject should follow a rule on this occasion, and 
no longer are we concerned with whether a rational putative intervener 
should intervene on this occasion.  Rather, we are concerned with how a 
person with power (not the same as authority) rationally intervenes in 
multiple other-regarding and harmful events, and thus how such a person 
(or institution) exercises control over multiple misbehaving agents.  And 
because rules are generalizations, with all of the under- and overinclusiveness 
that necessarily attaches to rules, the rational intervener imposes rules 
even as he recognizes that those rules will in effect mistakenly intervene 
on some occasions and mistakenly fail to intervene on others.  But in 
considering the imposition of rules, the rule-imposer will consider the 
issue in the aggregate, and will impose rules whenever she perceives that 
the harm she prevents by imposing rules in the area of their accurate 
application exceeds the harm she produces by imposing rules in the area 
of their inaccurate application. 
In imposing rules, therefore, the rational imposer is considering how 
she should maximize her control over multiple miscreants, or, to put it 
more gently, over multiple potentially misbehaving (to the detriment of 
third parties) agents.  These agents, when they do not believe that they 
 8. See generally Scott Shapiro, The Rationality of Rule-Guided Behavior: A 
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are misbehaving, will have reason to disregard the rule, especially if they 
make the decision after taking into account the possibility of their own 
error.  But the rational imposer of the rule may believe, rationally, also 
after taking account of the possibility of her own error, that the rule-
subjects will underestimate the possibility of their own error, and, 
consequently, it may be rational at times for the rational rule-imposer to 
act on the belief that rule-subjects will act irrationally.  Rule-imposition 
becomes rational, therefore, under circumstances in which the rule-
imposer believes, rationally, that rule-subjects will act irrationally (or at 
least mistakenly), even while those same rule-subjects are acting rationally 
in believing, from their lights, that the rule is asking them to act 
irrationally. 
IV. 
All of this may seem like immoral arrogance on the part of the rule-
imposer, but to believe that is to miss the point.  For if it is not immorally 
arrogant for me to think that I as a rule-subject am (beneficially) right 
and the rule is (dangerously) wrong—and this is the perspective in 
almost all of the literature on authority and on rule-following—then it is 
no more immorally arrogant for me to think that as a rule-imposer I am 
(beneficially) right and that as a rule-subject you are (dangerously) 
wrong.  And if it is not immorally arrogant to think that I am right and 
that you (singular) are wrong, then it is not immorally arrogant to think 
that I am right and you (plural) are wrong.  And because life is short and 
I have limited cognitive resources, I consequently impose rules simply 
as the embodiment of the view that I am right and you (plural) are 
wrong. 
Thus, even if, for the sake of argument, it is not rational to follow 
rules, and even if, for the sake of argument, it is not rational to impose 
rules on myself,9 it still can be rational to impose rules on others, and 
thus to try to get others to act in ways that they perceive to be irrational, 
but erroneously so.10  To put it differently, it is rational for me to try to 
 9. See Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
357 (1985). 
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HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695 (1991) (identifying a gap between the morality of 
imposing authority from the standpoint of the authority and the morality of accepting 
authority from the standpoint of the subject).  See also Larry Alexander & Emily 
Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1994). 
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get you to act in ways that you think, erroneously from my perspective, 
are irrational, and, to sharpen the point even further, it is irrational for 
me to act otherwise.  At the end of the day, after all of the discounting 
for the possibility of my own error, it is irrational and hardly arrogant for 
me to try to induce you not to behave in ways that I believe that you 
mistakenly believe to be rational. 
Nor does it help for me to think in terms of your autonomy, for as long 
as we are in the realm of harmful other-regarding actions, then your 
harm-producing autonomy counts not only for no more than my harm-
preventing autonomy, but also for no more than the autonomy of those 
third parties whose autonomy will be impaired by your actions.  Yes, I 
want you to be suspicious of my rules, but no less than I want me to be 
suspicious of your suspicion of my rules.  And, to put it bluntly, it is 
irrational of me to think and behave otherwise.  Blind obedience has a 
bad odor about it, but I would prefer that you not think than to think 
wrongly, and from my perspective I would prefer unthinking avoidance 
of harmful behavior than thoughtful engagement in harmful behavior.  
My first choice would be that you knowingly do the right thing, but as a 
second choice I would rather have you do the right thing unknowingly 
than do the wrong thing knowingly.  And all of this is in reality no 
different from the way you think of me, which is why arrogance drops 
out of the equation entirely. 
V. 
To re-emphasize the point that I urged at the outset of these remarks, 
little of this analysis makes any sense if the images we have in mind are 
those of smokers, drinkers, dopers, gamblers, wastrels, helmetless motorcycle 
riders, seat beltless drivers, midnight desert red light-runners, and all of 
the other typical protagonists of the literature on authority and deference.  
But if instead we imagine the instances in which the protagonists are 
rule-imposers and the rule-subjects are axe murderers, child molesters, 
price fixers, drunken drivers, sexual harassers, polluters, defrauders, and 
maybe even inside traders, then the issue looks quite different.  When 
the subjects of rules are potentially dangerous to third parties, it is not 
only moral and rational to impose rules, but on frequent occasion it is 
immoral and irrational not to. 
 
 
